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CONTRACTING IN THE AGE OF SMART CONTRACTS
Farshad Ghodoosi*
Abstract: Smart contracts lie at the heart of blockchain technology. There are two principal
problems, however, with existing smart contracts: first, the enforceability of smart contracts
remains ambiguous. Second, smart contracts are limited in scope and capability barring more
complex contracts from being executed via blockchain technology. Drawing from the existing
literature on contracts and smart contracting, this Article suggests new approaches to address
these two problems. First, it proposes a framework based on reliance-based contracting to
analyze smart contracts. Second, the Article analyzes the seismic shifts in contractual disputes,
and offers new insights into its features including decentralized decision-making,
network-based dispute resolution, and extrajudicial enforcement of decisions. The Article
concludes that users’ reliance should be the basis for analysis of smart contracts and its
associated dispute resolution mechanism.
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INTRODUCTION
Contracts are the bedrock of societies and play a vital role in bringing
us together. As the founder of sociology, Durkheim, stated roughly a
century ago, contracts serve as a central source of organic solidarity. For
him, “in a contract not everything is contractual.”1 Similarly, Hanna
Arendt emphasized that promise making and promise keeping arise
“directly out of the will to live together with others.”2 Contracting lies at
the heart of modern societies and human interaction lies at the heart
of contracting.3
Digital contracting, on the other hand, promises the opposite: less
involvement of human agents and increased automation of obligation
performance. What makes a contract “smart” is that it is self-executing
and self-enforcing which expunges the need for human intervention.4 New
technologies offer the vision that algorithms, codes, and artificial
intelligence determine parties’ obligations while parties often remain
1. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 158 (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press
1984) (1893).
2. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 245–46 (2d ed. 1998) (stating that morality, at least
politically, does not need support itself other “than the good will to counter the enormous risks of
action by readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to make promises and to keep them”).
3. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Frederick Pollock ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1906)
(1861) (“[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to
Contract.” (emphasis added)).
4. I prefer the term “digital contract” over “smart contract.” Smart contracts can only refer to
self-executing codes that run on a particular platform or software (e.g., Ethereum smart contracts)
similar to apps in smart phones. Digital contracts, however, refer to a broader phenomenon which is
automation of obligations and self-execution of contracts through computers and machine thinking.
Since the term smart contract has been widely adopted, I keep this term in this Article.

Ghodoosi (Do Not Delete)

2021]

3/22/2021 11:45 AM

SMART CONTRACTING

53

uninvolved and anonymous.5 The automation has a seismic impact on
contracting which traditionally relied on ex ante bargaining and
negotiation at arm’s length along with ex post dispute resolution and
enforcement.6 This impact requires further (and constant) reexamination
and analysis. This Article is a step in this direction.
Smart contracts, broadly defined, refer to transactions that machines
form, validate, and enforce. For example, imagine Amazon’s Alexa (a
virtual assistant) takes your order for pizza on a Sunday before football.
Now, Alexa, knowing your past choices for pizza and your preferred time,
automatically orders pizza on a Sunday before football. It can go even
further by searching all local pizzerias for the best deal and ordering pizza
on a Sunday before football. Moreover, if the pizza arrives late (which can
be determined via a scanning device at the front door of your house),
Alexa only releases half of the value of the pizza based on the pizzeria’s
declared policies.
Now imagine that all local pizzerias (sellers) and pizza lovers (buyers)
are part of a network while each buyer and seller has a virtual assistant
that a corporation like Amazon does not control.7 Additionally, no banks
clear monetary transactions between sellers and buyers in this network.
Here is how it can work: in this network, virtual assistants incorporate a
smart contract (a code) whereby it looks for the best price and best terms,
concludes the agreement, and transfers the amount. Once the transaction
is concluded, other users (which again are virtual assistants that
incorporate smart contracts) review the transaction, verify it, and store it
on a shared electronic book (so-called ledger). These transactions are
immutable, reviewable by all users, and the stored data can inform
future transactions.8
Smart contracts have widespread applications in various sectors,
particularly in in finance (e.g., Bitcoin, Ripple, Ethereum, Facebook,

5. See generally Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128 (2017)
(discussing the interpretation of electronic contracts whose algorithms may not be understandable ex
ante through the principles of agency common law).
6. See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Expectation Remedy and the Promissory Basis of
Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 799, 808 (2012) (“[A]rm’s length dealing remains the right model
for private law, especially commercial law . . . .”).
7. As this example shows and as was previously stated by Richard Gendal Brown, the smart
contracts are not just “a computer program.” They are “actor[s] in [their] own right.” They can
respond to “the receipt of information, [they] can receive and store value – and [they] can send out
information and send out value.” Richard Gendal Brown, A Simple Model for Smart Contracts,
RICHARD GENDAL BROWN: THOUGHTS ON THE FUTURE OF FIN. (Feb. 10, 2015) (emphasis in original),
https://gendal.me/2015/02/10/a-simple-model-for-smart-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/R93G-7J56].
8. See id.
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Libra) and production and supply chain9 (e.g., Walmart test pilot of
blockchain following the widespread contamination of romaine lettuce).10
Additionally, there are ongoing efforts to use blockchain in other sectors
including insurance (e.g., encoding rules for damages reimbursement),
governmental functions (e.g., identity management by automating
identity checks), healthcare (e.g., automating processes such as prior
authorization for specific treatments), Internet of Things (IoT) (e.g.,
washing machine automatically ordering a broken part), and sharing
economy (e.g., creating member-based autonomous organizations
replicating services such as Airbnb and Uber).11
Such digitization of contracts is changing the act of contracting along
with the socio-legal dynamics surrounding it. For one, this automated
process does not allow for the reciprocal recognition found in traditional
contracting.12 Orthodox contract law states that contractual obligations
come into existence because they are “immediately chosen”13 and
contracts are enforceable because “respect for [counterparties] as free and
rational” requires taking their promises seriously.14 In smart contracts,
however, interactions that occur through negotiations, an exchange of
promises, and mutual assent at the time of contracting are largely absent.
Smart contracting also directly affects the very notion of promise. Modern

9. Production refers to the process of creating goods for consumption. Supply chain refers to the
process of storing and moving finished goods from the point of production to consumers.
10. Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks Its Lettuce,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/walmart-blockchainlettuce.html [https://perma.cc/452M-S2S3].
11. Valentina Gatteschi, Fabrizio Lamberti & Claudio Demartini, Technology of Smart Contracts,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SMART CONTRACTS, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND DIGITAL
PLATFORMS 37, 45–53 (Larry A. DiMatteo et al. eds., 2019).
12. [T]he struggle for recognition is conceptually similar to contract formation in an essential
respect. Both involve a confrontation between seemingly independent beings, each seeking to
make the greatest possible use of the other while making the smallest possible contribution in
return. Yet the process in which they both become engaged—bargaining in the context of
contract, the dialectical process in that of the struggle for recognition—leads them to accept
voluntarily a very different outcome than that originally hoped for.
Michel Rosenfeld, Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1199, 1229 (1989).
13. Daniel Markovits, Theories of the Common Law of Contracts, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contracts-theories/
[https://perma.cc/PS8D-AXPZ] (“[A] tort obligation might arise in connection with a choice—as the
obligation not to be drunk arises in connection with the choice to operate a car; a contract obligation,
by contrast, is itself immediately chosen—at the core of every offer and every acceptance lies . . . an
intention to establish an obligation by communicating this intention.” (emphasis in original)).
14. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 20
(1981); see also Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years on, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 961, 962
(2012) [hereinafter Fried, Thirty Years on] (arguing that contract as promise is based on “morality of
autonomy, respect for persons and trust”).
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contracts—which Weber calls “purposive contract[s]”15—entail
“projection of exchange into the future.”16 In the same vein, orthodox
contract theory has emphasized the forward-looking feature of contracts
as the basis for contractual liability.17 The promise of smart contracts, on
the other hand, rests on the notion that exchanges occur synchronously
without future obligations remaining. These essential differences
necessitate revisiting the legal nature of smart contracts. The notion of
consent-based forward-looking contracts does not squarely fit
smart contracting.
The current literature has not addressed the nature of smart contracts in
light of contractual disputes. Existing legal literature on smart contracting
can be classified into three categories: the first category primarily explains
the difficult technology underlying smart contracting and providing
resemblance to existing legal doctrines.18 The second category focuses on
its limits and the hype around the technology.19 The third category
15. RICHARD SWEDBERG, MAX WEBER AND THE IDEA OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 101 (1998)
(quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 673
(1978)). Weber distinguishes between “the status contract” and “the purposive contract.” Id. The
former, which is typical for a primitive society, address a person’s total legal situation and result in a
change of one status to another (e.g., one’s wife). Id. The latter “aim[s] solely . . . at some specific
(especially economic) performance or result.” Id.
16. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 712–13 (1974).
17. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 799 (“[G]rounding contract in promise highlights two
of contract law’s most distinctive yet least understood features: that the law establishes liability
strictly, rather than based on fault; and that it creates forward-looking rather than the usual
backward-looking entitlements, entitlements to be made better off rather than to secure the status
quo ante.”).
18. See generally Jonathan G. Rohr, Smart Contracts and Traditional Contract Law, or: The Law
of the Vending Machine, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 71 (2019) (arguing that the body of law surrounding
vending machines can be applied to smart contracts); Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy & Rachel
Wilka, Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 313 (2018) (discussing the legal nature of smart contracts and suggesting universal
smart contracts standards and best practices); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex
Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017) (arguing that smart contracts will not displace contract law);
Stephen McJohn & Ian McJohn, The Commercial Law of Bitcoin and Blockchain Transactions, 47
UNIF. COM. CODE L.J. 187 (2017) (arguing that smart contracts may be functionally more like letters
of credit); Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 305
(2017) (arguing that smart contract are simply a “new form of preemptive self-help”).
19. See generally James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, 2 J.L. &
INNOVATION 1 (2019) (showing that all smart contracts are incomplete and ambiguous); Eliza Mik,
Smart Contracts: Terminology, Technical Limitations and Real World Complexity, 9 L. INNOVATION
& TECH. 269, 299 (2017) (showing that smart contracts are not a “semi-mythical technology liberating
the contracting parties from the shackles of traditional legal and financial institutions”); Carla L.
Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373 (2019) (showing the practical and
theoretical challenges arising out of blockchain-based business ventures under existing business
organization laws); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Persistence of “Dumb” Contracts, 2 STAN. J.
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1 (2019) (arguing that traditional contracts will persist to exists since smart
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analyzes the regulatory challenges arising from smart contracts.20 The
challenge in all the categories of the existing literature is three-fold: it
often focuses too much on the existing technology; it does not provide a
comprehensive view of smart contracting; and it mainly analyzes smart
contracts from the formation phase and does not take into account the
dispute phase.21 Moreover, the existing literature has largely concentrated
on the trust architecture (disintermediation) of the blockchain
technology.22 This Article, on the other hand, focuses more on the
distributed feature of the blockchain technology, and in particular
smart contracts.23
This Article makes two principal contributions. First, it contends that a
reliance-based (tort-like) approach better fits and explains the nature of
smart contracting. The Article argues the reliance theory best describes
smart contract transactions that are concluded largely absent of any human

contracts cannot replace human decision-making capability); Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the
Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 717 (2019) (arguing that smart contracts do not allow for “legal
intervention” points); Shaanan Cohney & David A. Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract
Stacks, 105 MINN. L. REV. 319 (2020) (arguing that smart contracts—or, as they call it, transactional
script—can lower some transactional costs relative to other legally operative instruments).
20. See generally Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21
N.C. BANKING INST. 177 (2017) (discussing the legal and regulatory issues associated with the greater
adoption of smart contracts); Shaanan Cohney, David Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick,
Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019) (showing empirically that coin offering
codes and initial coin offering disclosures often do not match); Adam J. Kolber, Not-So-Smart
Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198 (2018) (analyzing
third-party harms arising from smart contracts and possible regulations); Carla L. Reyes, Nizan
Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
ONLINE 1 (2017) (discussing the new governance structure of organizations based on smart contracts
and their regulatory risks); Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487 (2018) (discussing the necessity of regulation of smart contracts).
21. A handful of articles have endeavored to address this deficiency in the literature. See generally
Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Smart Contracts, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL.
103 (arguing that parties use online dispute resolution to resolve contract disputes); AMY J. SCHMITZ,
AM. ARB. ASS’N, MAKING SMART CONTRACTS “SMARTER” WITH ARBITRATION (2020),
https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Making%20Smart%20Contracts%20Smarter%20
with%20Arbitration%20by%20Amy%20Schmitz.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D8H-M5XZ] (arguing that
contracting parties should build arbitration into their smart contracts). For a general criticism from a
psychological perspective, see Jean R. Sternlight, Pouring a Little Psychological Cold Water on
Online Dispute Resolution, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 1. These articles generally center on the use of
existing dispute resolution mechanism for smart contracts. My suggestion is based on the network
potentials for dispute resolution. See infra Part IV for further discussion.
22. See KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 17–
32 (2018).
23. Although the blockchain technology achieves trust in part through the distributed feature, the
distributed characteristic of the blockchain technology alone, and in particular smart contracts, has
not received the requisite attention in the legal scholarship. Simply put, as this Article shows, the easy
and wide access to a distributed network of users has a foundational impact on contracting and
contractual disputes.
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involvement. Second, it shows that, in smart contracts, the human
connection can only exist in ex post dispute resolution. This Article argues
that ex post dispute resolution should utilize a large pool of users
(proof-of-work model) and not a handful of select users (proof-of-stake
model). With this structure, this Article argues, several of the existing
problems such as repeat players and consumer arbitration could
be minimized.
There are a few caveats to state at the outset of this Article: first, the
technology is still nascent and abstract but reachable. Second, to be
absolutely precise, the automation of the formation phase is conducted by
artificial intelligence (as it predicts future choices based on past choices),
and contractual enforcement is based on the blockchain technology which
automates enforcement while disintermediating institutions such as banks
via verification by other users. Third, not all smart contracts are spot
contracts.24 Some can be relational to a certain extent.25 The focus of this
Article, however, is on fully automated machine-to-machine smart
contracts that transact on the spot.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I provides more background
on smart contracts and the most relevant features to this discussion. Part II
analyzes the limits of the existing theories on the legal nature of smart
contracts. Part III provides a novel approach in analyzing smart contracts
and argues for a reliance-based theory of smart contracts. Part IV
investigates the problem of incompleteness in smart contracts and the lack
of entry points for parties and courts to address the inherent
incompleteness. Part IV focuses on contractual disputes in the age of
smart contracts and proposes a truly decentralized user-based dispute
resolution mechanism.
I.

WHAT MAKES SMART CONTRACTS SMART?

In the first section below, the Article reviews and analyzes the key
features of smart contracts. It explains automation, anonymity, and
verification process offered by smart contracts. In the second section, the
Article zeros in on the verification and validation process while explaining
how it has the capability of creating a network-based enforcement
mechanism without relying on a centralized authority.
24. Here I use the term spot contracts to refer to one-off agreements that occur on a specific date
and are not durational. In finance, spot contracts refer to agreements of buying and selling on the spot
date as opposed to future (forward) contracts where payments and delivery are stipulated for a later
date. See, e.g., James Chen, Spot Trade, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 23, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/spottrade.asp [https://perma.cc/73GV-9YYW].
25. Stefan Grundmann & Philipp Hacker, Digital Technology as a Challenge to European Contract
Law: From the Existing to the Future Architecture, 13 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 255, 267–69 (2017).
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Explaining Smart Contracts

What is smart about smart contracts? The answer lies in the possibility
of automatic execution using algorithm and codes.26 Smart contracts refer
to obligations that are programmable and operate on a distributed
network. The notion of smart contracts was first proposed by Nick Szabo
who is also widely believed to be the Bitcoin founder, Satoshi Nakamoto,
a fact he has repeatedly denied.27 According to Szabo, smart contracts
consist of “a set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols
within which the parties perform on these promises.”28 Smart contracts
are therefore protocols, or set of rules or procedures for transmitting data.
In other words, smart contracts that are embedded in a blockchain can
automatically “receive and send assets as well as information.”29 For
Szabo, smart contracts “should be embedded in the world,” meaning “to
embed contracts in all sorts of property that is valuable and controlled by
digital means.”30
To simplify, given the existing technology, smart contracts are similar
to apps.31 Just like apps—e.g., Google Maps—smart contracts run on a
platform (in this case the blockchain with specific consensus mechanisms)
and each has its own rules. In smart contracts, the obligations of the parties
are pre-determined by computer programs. More importantly, this new
technology enables two vending machines to transact, without direct
human involvement, if a condition occurs. For example, if the temperature
reaches ninety degrees, vending machine A is programmed to
automatically transfer a dollar bill to vending machine B, which in turn
delivers a can of cold soda. Another example is fintech companies’
algorithmic trading, by which computer programs determine the selling or
buying of stocks.32 For instance, a computer program is set to “sell” an
existing stock if its value drops more than 10% while another computer is

26. Raskin, supra note 18, at 306.
27. Nathan Reiff, Who Is Nick Szabo, and Is He Satoshi Nakamoto?, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 12,
2018), https://www.investopedia.com/news/who-nick-szabo-and-he-satoshi-nakamoto/
[https://perma.cc/99F7-QUHF].
28. NICK SZABO, SMART CONTRACTS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR DIGITAL MARKETS (rev. ed. 2018).
29. Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich, Regulating
Blockchain, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 1, 4 (Philipp
Hacker et al. eds., 2019).
30. SZABO, supra note 28 (emphasis in original).
31. Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 263, 276 (2017).
32. Fintech refers to the use of technology and innovation in banking and financial services. See
Julia Kagan, Financial Technology–Fintech, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp [https://perma.cc/JZS2-7Y49].
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programed to “buy” the same stock if its value drops more than 10%. If
such automated transactions are built on a blockchain platform where
other users verify the transaction, not an external body such as the Security
and Exchange Commission, the contract is a smart contract. A key
relevant feature of smart contracts in the formation phase of contracting
is that computers do not exchange promises.33 Instead, each computer
includes codes that unliterally determine the condition of a transfer (if the
stock drops 10%, then buy). Only when other computer codes match the
conditions of the first computer, the transaction occurs (if the stock drops
10%, then sell). Smart contracts therefore most resemble cross-offers.34
In a general sense, smart contracting refers to the take-over of contract
formation and performance by machine thinking.35 Machine-made
contracts by IoT devices such as Alexa or Google Home may be the future
of contracting, in which machines take over not only a digital reality (e.g.,
Bitcoin) but a physical object (e.g., real property).36 This possibility is not
just theoretical as the “perfect pair” of smart contracts (built on a
blockchain-based platform) and IoT has led to several startups in food
supply, medicine shipping, manufacturing, construction, energy, and
transportation, to name a few.37 Relatedly, as many as fifty major
companies, such as Amazon, Walmart, JP Morgan and BP, are adopting
the blockchain technology.38 Walmart and Facebook also announced that
33. Raskin, supra note 18, at 323.
34. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047, 1058 (2001)
(The author poses the example of crossing offers: “If I mail you an offer to buy soda for $1.00, and
you simultaneously mail me an offer to sell soda for $1.00, no contract results.”). In these instances,
the contract validity therefore relies on agency principles. See id. at 1059.
35. Lipshaw, supra note 19, at 5 (describing that smart contracting means to “delegate more and
more of the creation, performance, and disposition of legally binding transactions to
machine thinking”).
36. See SURABHI KEJRIWAL & SAURABH MAHAJAN, DELOITTE CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS., SMART
BUILDINGS: HOW IOT TECHNOLOGY AIMS TO ADD VALUE FOR REAL ESTATE COMPANIES (2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/real-estate/deloitte-nl-fsi-real-estatesmart-buildings-how-iot-technology-aims-to-add-value-for-real-estate-companies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AL3-YBFD]; see also IOTA, https://www.iota.org [https://perma.cc/8SR2-AAF3]
(initiative by IOTA which uses a distributed ledger technology to record and execute transactions
between machines and devices in IoT).
37. Rohan Pinto, Demystifying the Relationship Between IoT and Blockchain, FORBES TECH.
COUNCIL (May 29, 2019, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/
05/29/demystifying-the-relationship-between-iot-and-blockchain/?sh=e78c05f605de
[https://perma.cc/L4S7-BVK8]. For example, leasing a car can be done via blockchain technology.
Using this technology, searching, negotiating, and concluding the lease contract can be completed on
the blockchain platform. If, for example, the lessee fails to make payment, the smart key of the car
automatically stops the car until payment is made. Sklaroff, supra note 31, at 273–74.
38. Michael del Castillo, Blockchain Goes to Work at Walmart, Amazon, JPMorgan, Cargill and
46 Other Enterprises, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
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they will launch their own currencies based on blockchain (so-called
cryptocurrency).39
To summarize, smart contracts offer three features: (1) full automation
of contract formation and execution; (2) contract validation by other
users; (3) anonymity of contractual parties.40 One of the principal
differences between smart contracts and traditional contracts relates to its
autonomous execution and termination. Smart contracts are essentially
coded obligations that are enforced autonomously. Such codes are
distributed within various nodes (different users/computers) in the
underlying platform and network.41 This design makes several key
features of traditional contracting almost impossible: termination,
modification, interpretation, and even adjudication.42 Since codes for
smart contracts act as the rule of the game in the platform on which
different users/nodes rely, any modification is extremely difficult.43 In
summary, a smart contract encodes certain conditions and outcomes so
that if such conditions occur, the contract automatically executes itself.

michaeldelcastillo/2019/04/16/blockchain-goes-to-work/#192dc52e2a40 [https://perma.cc/9ENZ8VXY].
39. Ron Shevlin, Why Does Walmart Want a Cryptocurrency?, FORBES (Aug. 5, 2019, 11:00
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2019/08/05/why-does-walmart-want-acryptocurrency/#54d8a7e91502 [https://perma.cc/A4TQ-JMF2].
40. Sklaroff, supra note 31, at 264. Moreover, smart contracting can cause several groundbreaking
shifts in firm contracting and corporate governance. It alters firm contracting since it removes certain
transactions costs while adding others. It automates certain organizational and governmental
decisions. It provides more power to smaller stakeholders. Alex Murray, Scott Kuban, Matthew
Josefy & Jon Anderson, Contracting in the Smart Era: The Implications of Blockchain and
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations for Contracting and Corporate Governance, ACAD.
MGMT. PERSPS. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://journals.aom.org/doi/abs/10.5465/AMP.2018.0066 (last
visited Mar. 3, 2021).
41. PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE
74–75 (2018); see also Castillo, supra note 38 (“At its core, blockchain is simply a distributed
database, with an identical copy stored on many computers.”).
42. Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts and Their Potential and
Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contracts-and-their-potentialand-inherent-limitations/ [https://perma.cc/8S5W-HB7W].
43. See id. (“Indeed, given that blockchains are immutable, modifying a smart contract is far more
complicated than modifying standard software code that does not reside on a blockchain. The result
is that amending a smart contract may yield higher transaction costs than amending a text-based
contract, and increases the margin of error that the parties will not accurately reflect the modifications
they want to make.”). In such platforms, any change would likely require 51% of the users. For
example, in Bitcoin, 51% attack refers to the hypothetical that a group of miners acquire more than
50% of the platform computing power and therefore could change the rules of the game (e.g.,
confirming transactions, executing payments, and prohibiting double-spending). Jake Frankenfield,
51% Attack, INVESTOPEDIA (May 6, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/51-attack.asp
[https://perma.cc/UEE2-QN36].
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This process can be verified by other nodes in the network.44
Several states have adopted laws related to smart contracts that include
definitions referring to smart contracts as event driven.45 These laws
typically define the smart contract as “an event-driven program, with
state, that runs on a distributed, decentralized, shared and replicated ledger
and that can take custody over and instruct transfer of assets on that
ledger.”46 They also confirm that smart contracts “may exist in
commerce” and a contract shall not be denied “legal effect, validity or
enforceability solely because that contract contains a smart
contract term.”47
B.

Validation and Verification

Smart contracts automate the formation and performance of contractual
obligations. Traditional contract law is agential, believing in the notion
that human agents can choose to assume certain obligations through
contracting (e.g., autonomy principle or will theory in contract law).48 In
smart contracting, much of the contract formation and performance are
delegated to an electronic agent.49 Machines, which can use artificial
intelligence and machine learning to predict and exercise new promises,
take over the very act of promising. In other words, human will is
increasingly missing from the ex ante formation of contracts. This casts
44. ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., A POLICYMAKER’S
GUIDE TO BLOCKCHAIN 20–21 (2019), https://itif.org/sites/default/files/2019-policymakers-guideblockchain.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW4B-5DEK].
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-201 (2020).
46. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(e)(2). The Tennessee law offers a more detailed definition.
It provides a similar definition but adds that the ledger is “used to automate transactions, including,
but not limited to, transactions that: (A) [t]ake custody over and instruct transfer of assets on that
ledger; (B) [c]reate and distribute electronic assets; (C) [s]ynchronize information; or (D) [m]anage
identity and user access to software applications.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-201(2).
47. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061(c).
48. In a classic article from 1941, Lon Fuller defined the autonomy principle as follows:
the most pervasive and indispensable is the principle of private autonomy. This principle simply
means that the law views private individuals as possessing a power to effect, within certain limits,
changes in their legal relations. . . . This power of the individual to effect changes in his legal
relations with others is comparable to the power of a legislature.
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806–07 (1941). With the expansion
of the law and economics approach, scholars also proposed theories of contract law based on
efficiency. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003) (discussing traditional theories of contract law and
their limits).
49. Electronic agent is defined as “a computer program, or electronic or other automated means
used independently to initiate an action or respond to electronic messages or performances without
intervention by an individual at the time of the action, response or performance.” UNIF. COMPUT.
INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 102(a)(28) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1999).
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doubt on the moral theory of contracting since “[p]romises lie at the center
of persons’ moral experience of one another, and contracts lie at the center
of their legal experience of one another.”50
The validation and verification process of smart contracting changes
the network structure based on which contractual parties enter into
agreements. In traditional contracting, parties enter into agreements
against the backdrop of law and judicial enforcement.51 Parties rely on
trust, law, and a select group of people for validation and verification of
their contracts.52 For instance, in the purchase of a used laptop via
Amazon, the buyer has to exercise some level of trust in the platform and
in the buyer. The buyer is also under the belief that law has put in place
certain measures to protect them from fraudulent activities. The buyer can
also rely on reviews about the seller and request a few of their trusted
acquaintances to check the specifics of the merchandise or examine it. A
similar network structure also exists for the seller.
In traditional contracting, the seller and buyer are mostly reliant on a
few centralized networks for their transactions: a group of trusted
individuals (e.g., close friends, lawyers, experts, etc.); platform providers
(e.g., Amazon); and the legal system (e.g., the judiciary). The contractual
parties are also largely familiar with these networks. The form of trust
radically changes through smart contracting, in which parties are reliant
on computers, codes, and peers (other nodes) to validate their
transactions.53 In this structure, parties (or to be more precise, electronic
agents) transact in reliance on a network of unknown individuals (nodes)
with whom they are not familiar. Smart contracts function pursuant to a
game theory, in which other nodes in the network are incentivized to

50. Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419 (2004).
51. Contract enforcement is a matter of public law. See, e.g., Farshad Ghodoosi, The Concept of
Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private
Legal Arrangements, 94 NEB. L. REV. 685, 697 (2016) (“[E]nforcing a contract is a matter of public
law.”); David A. Hoffman & Cathy Hwang, The Social Cost of Contract, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2188/
[https://perma.cc/97X4-4GDN] (arguing that contracts are “bargains that always involve the public”);
Aditi Bagchi, Interpreting Contracts in a Regulatory State, 54 U. S.F. L. REV. 35, 41 (2019) (noting
that “[o]ur modern regulatory state can, and sometimes does, directly regulate those terms”); Cathy
Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Contractual Depth (Nov. 10, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://am.aals.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/12/AM20BusinessLawHwang
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DSQ-SWHF] (describing how contracts between private parties are
written with regulators as an intended audience).
52. For the discussion of trust in contract law see generally Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust,
and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25 (2002).
53. MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 44, at 5.
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validate the contracts.54 In the process of smart contracting, each time a
transaction is concluded, the platform simultaneously broadcast it the
entire network. Once different nodes validate and verify the transaction, a
new block is added to the blockchain.55 In other words, once a consensus
is reached amongst the users, a block inscribed with the transaction is
added to the chain.
Scholars and computer scientists disagree over the technology and the
features of blockchain.56 For example, a key feature of blockchain is its
decentralization.57 As noted, in the current technology, decentralization
has not been achieved yet.58 More importantly, human agency has been
instrumental in the blockchain technology as “many actions taken by
small, coordinated groups of people” made pivotal changes to Bitcoin
and Ethereum.59
Technology rapidly changes, so discussing the nuances of it is often
times moot. The most salient aspect of blockchain technology is that it
allows for record keeping of transactions that are verified by a consensus
mechanism in a decentralized system. Imagine a ridesharing company
where all rides and payments are recorded on an immutable, decentralized
chain of blocks instead of a company recording and managing this data.
The types of information and the ways in which this information is
recorded are all determined by the validation and verification process of
this network (instead of being dictated by a company). To put it more
simply, imagine a group of friends who decide to record their daily

54. See generally Giancarlo Bigi, Andrea Bracciali, Giovanni Meacci & Emilio Tuosto, Validation
of Decentralised Smart Contracts Through Game Theory and Formal Methods, in PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGES WITH APPLICATIONS TO BIOLOGY AND SECURITY 142, 142 (Chiara Bodei et al. eds.,
2015) (combining game theory and formal methods to address the complexity of the analysis and
validation of smart contracts).
55. MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 44, at 5.
56. Adrianne Jeffries, ‘Blockchain’ Is Meaningless, THE VERGE (Mar. 7, 2018, 11:36 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/7/17091766/blockchain-bitcoin-ethereum-cryptocurrencymeaning [https://perma.cc/FH53-5B8J] (noting that “there is widespread disagreement over which
qualities are essential in order to call something a blockchain”); see also Marco Iansiti & Karim R.
Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 2017),
https://hbr.org/2017/01/the-truth-about-blockchain [https://perma.cc/KSL2-WYJK].
57. Mally Anderson, Exploring Decentralization: Blockchain Technology and Complex
Coordination, J. DESIGN & SCI. (Feb. 6, 2019), https://jods.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/7vxemtm3/
release/1 [https://perma.cc/6N2E-A4S6] (“More importantly, blockchain-supported technologies can
potentially facilitate decentralized coordination and alignment of human incentives on a scale that
only top-down, command-and-control structures previously could.”).
58. Angela Walch, Deconstructing ‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto
Systems, in CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVE 39, 58 (Chris
Brummer ed., 2019) (arguing that decentralization has created a veil for people who are behind the
technology in order to limit their liabilities).
59. Id. at 67.
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expenditure. They can hire an accountant. Alternatively, they can set in
place a mechanism by which each transaction is recorded by the members
of the group following the pre-approved verification process of other
members. The latter resembles the core of what blockchain technology
promises to do.60 To be clear, humans create blockchain platforms and the
underlying codes. Humans, however, have limited roles in changing the
smart contract codes once they are programmed.
II.

LIMITS OF EXISTING LEGAL THEORIES OF SMART
CONTRACTS

As discussed, smart contracts consist of “a set of promises, specified in
digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on
these promises.”61 In other words, smart contracts—embedded in a
blockchain—can automatically receive and send assets and information.62
For smart contracts to work, parties’ obligations should be well
thought-out and ingrained in a self-executing code (e.g., if/then). Vending
machines are the often-given analogy for smart contracts where parties’
obligations are carefully pre-determined.63 All that is needed to trigger the
contract is a dollar bill. Contracts are therefore simple and binary (e.g., if
a dollar bill, then soda). Smart contracts further take the automated feature
of a vending machine further. In vending machines, only one party’s
performance is automated (i.e., the vending machine’s). In smart
contracts, however, both parties’ performance of obligations is automated
with no future obligations remaining to be executed.64 Moreover, in smart
contracts, parties can even delegate the very conclusion of contracts to
electronic agents65 and their obligations can be “synchronous,” unlike the
asynchronous relationship between a vending company and a consumer.66
In these limited contracts, therefore, there are only broken codes, not

60. See generally Luke Conway, Blockchain Explained, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp [https://perma.cc/VW2U-53A8]. There are
many videos on YouTube on the topic. I have found this very brief explanation by the BBC helpful:
BBC News, Bitcoin Explained: How Do Cryptocurrencies Work?–BBC News, YOUTUBE (Feb. 12,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzAuB2FG79A [https://perma.cc/HU3U-AXKR].
61. SZABO, supra note 28.
62. Hacker et al., supra note 29, at 9.
63. Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts as the Beginning of the End of
Classic Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COMMC’NS TECH. L. 116, 120 (2017).
64. Id. at 129. Some scholars find the lack of future obligation “simply inconsistent” with
traditional notions of contracting as “[t]ypical contracts” involve future performance by one or more
parties. Kolber, supra note 20, at 221–22.
65. Savelyev, supra note 63, at 121.
66. SZABO, supra note 28.
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bargaining nor broken promises.67 Disputes can arise out of unforeseen
coding errors or hacks.68 As a result, smart contracts include “occasional
earthquakes” rather than “continual linguistic drift” that is inherent in
traditional contracting.69
In the last several decades, contract theory has focused on three
paradigms for theorizing about the enforceability of contracts: promisor,
promisee, and socio-economics surrounding the transaction.70 The
bargain theory states that the promisor’s manifested intention to create
legal relations result in contractual obligations and is the basis of
enforceability of contracts.71 This theory has also stressed the element of
exchange in which only reciprocal promises are enforceable.72 The
reliance theory, on the other hand, shifts the focus onto the reliance made
by the promisee as a result of a promise.73 Under this view, contracts are
67. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 322–23 (discussing that in computable contracts if the
“computation diverges from the parties’ intent, as conventionally understood in contract law, they
may disregard the computerized result”).
68. One example is the 2016 hack by the Decentralized Autonomous Organization. David Siegel,
Understanding
the
DAO
Attack,
COINDESK
(Dec.
17,
2020,
1:50
PM),
https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists [https://perma.cc/B998-HHDW]. In
this hack, the attacker found a small bug in the DOA contract code and was able to transfer around
$60 million to a contract of which they were in sole control. See id.
69. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 20. The latter term—continual linguistic drift—refers to the
interpretative feature of traditional contracting whereas the former—occasional earthquakes—
emphasizes the failure and incompleteness of codes underlying smart contracts.
70. Markovits, supra note 13.
71. See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 14; SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1924);
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 304–05 (1986); Randy E.
Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022, 1027 (1992);
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 799. Scholars differ whether a moral-based approach to
promise forms the basis of contract obligation or objective consent. Charles Fried insists on the moral
institution of promising as the basis of contracting whereas Randy Barnett argues for manifestation
of an intention, not promising per se, as the most salient aspect of contracting. Compare Fried, Thirty
Years on, supra note 14, at 978, with Barnett, supra, at 305.
72. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1261–62 (1980). This theory is called the “bargain theory” in which
un-reciprocal promises are presumptively unenforceable.
73. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974) (arguing that the expansion of
the reliance theory eroded the classical consideration theory in contract law); L.L. Fuller & William
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 419 (1937) (“If one
means by ‘contractual’ a liability imposed because a promise was made and broken, then a liability
to compensate losses incurred on the faith of a promise is as ‘contractual’ as any other.”). Section 90
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which sets out the doctrine of promissory estoppel, is the
primary enforcement mechanism for situations where the promisee relies on the promisor’s promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981); see also Juliet P. Kostritsky, A
New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An
Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 895, 964 (1987) (arguing that courts should use
promissory estoppel “when persuasive barriers to, or explanations for dispensing with, explicit
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enforceable because people rely on the promises they receive.74 The last
paradigm centers on the efficiency resulting from an exchange of
promises (law-and-economics75) or the shared public norms such as
coordinating conduct (relational contract theory76).
Legal scholars have debated the legal nature of smart contracts. Some
believe smart contracts are neither smart nor contracts in part because
parties may enter into legal obligations without “knowing it or intending
to.”77 This view is reinforced by the fact that smart contracts “are simply
business rules encoded in software” and therefore are “not legally binding
without contractual agreements.”78 Some believe that smart contracts are
contracts “at the conceptual level” but do not necessarily constitute
exchange of promises per se.79 Some point to the limited role of law in
smart contracts because there is no entry point for legal intervention in

reciprocal or formalized contracts exist and a plausible benefit to the promisor can be identified”);
Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent
Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 472, 482–87, 531–36 (1983) (arguing that promissory
estoppel is a tort-like and independent theory of recovery that is different from contractual liability);
Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 303, 303–11 (1992)
(shedding light on the debate between enforcement of promise or the protection of reliance as the
basis for promissory estoppel).
74. See generally Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 HARV. L. REV.
678 (1984) (arguing that promissory estoppel represents a failed attempt to address the contradictions
of legal classicism); Barnett, supra note 71 (summarizing the problems with the promise theory of
contract); P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979) (showing the history
and limits of promise-based liability as opposed to reliance-based liabilities); Omri Ben-Shahar,
Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1829 (2004) (exploring the “no-retraction” theory of contract where each party is obligated to the
terms manifested by them and can refrain only with some liability); Richard Craswell, Offer,
Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996) (exploring efficient reliance as an
economic rationale in contract formation cases); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The
Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996)
(examining promissory estoppel as it applies in the context of preliminary negotiations through a lens
of rational choice economic theory); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual
Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001) (analyzing the decision to invest in precontractual reliance
under alternative legal regimes).
75. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4–7, 17–19 (1986).
76. For example, according to Patrick Atiyah, it is the society, not law, that determines and defines
obligations and entitlements. P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 129 (1981); Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 862 n.24 (1978) (arguing that all aspects of
contractual relations are subject to the norms characterizing contracts generally and identifying
(1) harmonizing conflict and (2) preservation of the relation as two norms particularly applicable to
contractual relations).
77. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 4; see also Rohr, supra note 18, at 72 (“‘Smart contract’ is an
unfortunate name for something that is not necessarily smart, or necessarily a contract.”).
78. MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 44, at 24.
79. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 341.
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these contracts.80 Others have categorized smart contracts based on the
role of the algorithm. Depending on whether the algorithm is a gap-filler
or a negotiator (tool or agent), the legal nature of such contracts differs.81
Some have criticized that smart contracts eliminate the social function
of the act of contracting because the “technology of smart contracts
neglects the fact that people use contracts as social resources to manage
their relations.”82 Moreover, contracts are purported to be the main avenue
for private lawmaking where individuals can solve their problems and
regulate their behavior at the micro level.83 Such private lawmaking
becomes automated and atomized with smart contracts. Smart contracts
are also not reliant on third-party intermediaries or human agency for
their execution.84
The critique of smart contracts therefore comes from both legal and
social angles. The skepticism towards smart contracts in law derives in
large part from the nature of smart contracts that aim to resolve all issues
ex ante and leaves little to no room for corrective measures ex post.85
Smart contracts are entirely reliant on “ex ante formalizations, which can
never match the flexibility of ex post human decision-making.”86 In other
words, it is the lack of human connection and decision-making that has in
part sparked the skepticism about the legal and social nature of smart
contracts. These studies have largely focused on the immutability and
automation of smart contracts while overlooking the distributed aspects
of smart contracts.87 The distributed function enables new methods of
contract-making and resolution of disputes. This Part surveys the various
approaches to the nature of smart contracts while providing fresh insights.
A.

No Contract
Assent is a foundational requirement for contracts. Contract law

80. Rodrigues, supra note 19, at 717 (“[W]hen gaps arise in the blockchain’s smart contracts, there
are no legal intervention points upon which the law can work.”).
81. Scholz, supra note 5, at 136 (“Contracts where the algorithms help the parties as mere tools
typically do not present any new issue for contract law. They are no different from a party using a
calculator or a basic excel program to determine what to offer or accept. . . . When algorithms act as
negotiators, more interpretive work is required to show the fit with contract law.”).
82. Karen E. C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and the
Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2017).
83. Avery W. Katz, Contract Theory—Who Needs It?, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2043, 2046 (2014) (“The
key feature of contract law . . . is that it affords private parties the power of lawmaking.”).
84. Alex Murray et al., supra note 40, at 36–42.
85. Arvind Narayanan, Lecture 11–The Future of Bitcoin?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 27, 2015),
https://youtu.be/YG7l0XPtzD4 [https://perma.cc/R2L7-XRCB].
86. WERBACH, supra note 22, at 163.
87. Sklaroff, supra note 31, at 276.
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requires mutual assent between parties or a “meeting of the minds.”88 With
the advancement of technology, it was this requirement that led some to
believe that smart contracts are not contracts since they lack human
assent.89 Moreover, along with the rapid progress of artificial intelligence
(AI), AI can take over more aspects of contracting including bargaining,
negotiation, and formation of contracts.90 This means lesser involvement
of human agents and lesser relevance of consent.
Codes and algorithms can be expressions of assent,91 but it is the
mutuality that can be a problem in smart contracts.92 This approach
suggests that smart contracts are not enforceable because they do not
satisfy the requirement of “manifestation of assent.”93 In other words, lack
of (apparent) assent forms the basis for doubting the contractual nature of
smart contracts.94 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that
for a contract to be formed, each party should manifest assent with
reference to manifestation of the other.95 This requirement casts doubt on
the notion of assent in smart contracts where neither side of the bargain
manifests assent in reference to the other side’s offer.96 Simply put, as
mentioned above, smart contracts resemble unilateral offers that cross
each other and are not in reference or in response to another offer.97
Due to the challenges arising from the lack of explicit assent, the law

88. This requirement has been repeated in court decisions and can be inferred from the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1981).
For the opposite and minority view, see Val Ricks, Assent Is Not an Element of Contract Formation,
61 KAN. L. REV. 591 (2013). See also SMART CONTS. ALL., CHAMBER OF DIGIT. COM., SMART
CONTRACTS: IS THE LAW READY? 17 (2018) [hereinafter SMART CONTRACTS] (“The use of smart
contracts may raise questions about whether the contracting parties have had a ‘meeting of the minds,’
when at least one side of the contracting process is consummated without human participation
or intervention.”).
89. SMART CONTRACTS, supra note 88, at 17–18.
90. Id. at 9.
91. Harry Surden, Computable Contract, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 629, 656 (“[B]asic contracting
principles actively accommodate data-oriented representation.”).
92. SMART CONTRACTS, supra note 88, at 41–42.
93. In the same vein, some scholars point that code cannot literally be a contract because “no
physical representation of an agreement can ever entirely represent the agreement.” Kolber, supra
note 20, at 219. Moreover, a mutually-binding agreement, in their view, “cannot be reduced to a press
of a button.” Id. at 220.
94. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 340 (“Do smart contracts involve promises or
obligations? In a significant sense, ‘no.’”).
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (AM. L. INST. 1981); id. § 23 (“It is essential
to a bargain that each party manifest assent with reference to the manifestation of the other.”).
96. Bellia, Jr., supra note 34, at 1052–53.
97. See id. at 1058. In these instances, the contract validity therefore relies on agency principles.
See id. at 1059.
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moved towards agency theory and attribution.98 Most notably, the United
States Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UCITA)
provided that individuals are bound by the “operations of the electronic
agent” even if such individuals are not “aware of or [have not] reviewed
the agent’s operations or the results of the operations.”99 Under this
theory, human agents provide a general assent to electronic agents even if
human agents are not aware of the details of each transaction.100 This
approach is also reflected in the Electronic Signature in Global and
National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act), which provided that contracts
formed as a result of electronic agents may not be denied legal effect so
long as “the action of [the] electronic agent is legally attributable to the
person to be bound.”101
B.

Unilateral Contracts

A key feature of smart contracts is that parties do not exchange
promises.102 The promises are in the form of offers that cross each other.103
In these types of contracts, one party puts a contract in the form of codes
(smart) on a platform such as Ethereum.104 The smart contract therefore
contains a set of unilaterally stipulated codes (conditions) that allow for
the transfer of a digital asset or e-currency if those conditions are met.105
Pursuant to this approach, smart contracts are “interrelated unilateral
contracts,”106 by which each party presents its side of the
bargain unilaterally.
Under this approach, performance of the conditions presented by the
98. See id. at 1059–65; see also SMART CONTRACTS, supra note 88, at 17.
99. UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 107(d) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1999).
100. Bellia, Jr., supra note 34, at 1059–65.
101. Electronic Signature in Global and National Commerce Act § 101(h), 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h).
Agency theory however has its own critics. For example, electronic agents do not have human
judgments and intentionality and cannot hold fiduciary duties towards their principal. Werbach &
Cornell, supra note 18, at 341; see also Bellia, Jr., supra note 34, at 1065; SAMIR CHOPRA &
LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 55–61 (2011).
102. Raskin, supra note 18, at 323.
103. Bellia, Jr., supra note 34, at 1058. In these instances, the contract validity therefore relies on
agency principles. See id. at 1059.
104. Loi Luu, Duc-Hiep Chu, Hrishi Olickel, Prateek Saxena & Aquinas Hobor, Making Smart
Contracts Smarter, CCS ’16: PROC. OF THE 2016 ACM SIGSAC CONF. ON COMPUT. & COMMC’NS
SEC., Oct. 2016, at 254 (“Recently, Ethereum’s smart contract system has seen steady adoption,
supporting tens of thousands of contracts, holding millions [of] dollars worth of virtual coins.”);
Rodrigues, supra note 19, at 698 (“The Ethereum blockchain permits the central recording not just of
an exchange, but of contractual conditions and limits on the circumstances under which an exchange
can occur.”).
105. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 343.
106. Id.
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smart contract is key for the analysis of the contractual nature of the
transaction. In a unilateral contract, the offeree can only accept the offer
by performance rather than exchanging promises.107 The classic
illustration of a unilateral contract is where the offeror states “I will give
you $100 if you walk across the Brooklyn bridge.”108 In these types of
contracts, contractual liability exists upon performance without the need
for exchange or return of promise. This feature has been the reason for
judges adopting the unilateral contracts framework in instances where a
promise given goes unreciprocated. For example, one study shows that
judges have used the concept of unilateral contracts and found
“promissory liability” of the employer in the context of employee benefits
“without the necessity of finding a return promise by the employee.”109
The same analysis applies to the blockchain technology where initiators
of smart contracts offer certain digital assets or crypto-currency if offerees
perform by, for example, solving complex mathematical problems.110
Smart contracts therefore create a digital escrow where funds can only be
released if certain conditions (performance) are satisfied by the offeree.111
C.

Agreement to Agree

Another theory of smart contracts rests on the notion that such contracts
are agreements to agree. Smart contracts therefore simply invite further
agreements and lack essential contractual terms. Although in most current
107. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts does not refer to unilateral contracts but discusses the
topic in section 45, i.e., option contracts that are created by part performance or tender. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (AM. L. INST. 1981). As one scholar stated, the drafters
of the second restatement tried to purge the term “unilateral contract” but kept its legal device. Daniela
Caruso, Then and Now: Mark Pettit’s Modern Unilateral Contracts in the 1980s and in the Age of
Blockchains, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2018). The drafters’ skeptical view towards unilateral
contracts originated from Professor Karl Llewellyn, who criticized the common law categorization of
unilateral versus bilateral contracts. See generally K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract
Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1 (1938). A few decades later, however, Professor Mark Pettit
showed that courts have consistently invoked the concept of unilateral contracts in their decisions
including in the context of employee benefits. See generally Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral
Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551 (1983).
108. I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136
(1916); see also Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 102 A. 106, 107 (Me. 1917) (ruling that performance of
the act accounts for acceptance and creates a binding contract).
109. Pettit, Jr., supra note 107, at 565; see also Caruso, supra note 107, at 1791.
110. Caruso, supra note 107, at 1793.
111. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 341–44. (“[T]he smart contract somewhat breaks down
the traditional line between executory and executed contracts. Like the conveyance, there is no
promise left to be performed. Unlike the conveyance, though, the smart contract does not transfer
property at the time. It is neither executory, insofar as there is no action left to be performed, nor is it
executed, insofar as the result is yet to be accomplished. This causes conceptual difficulty. Smart
contracts are both committing to something in the future, but not exactly making a promise.”).
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forms of smart contracts important terms are specified due to simplicity
(for example, if mining is completed first, the miner receives Bitcoin), this
theory may be applied to more complex smart contracts. Under this
approach, again, reliance is key and mutual assent is not necessary.112 The
agreement to agree, or precontractual agreement, lies in the grey area of
“full-blown contracts” and “no obligation.”113 More importantly, this
framework can work well for smart contracting where each side puts
forward its own set of conditions and, as discussed, parties dispatch cross
offers.114 Under this view, the inherent incompleteness of smart
contracting stems from the fact that each party attaches different meanings
to the obligations.115 The discord over the meanings and scope of the
obligations, however, does not negate liability.116 In other words, liability
should always arise from unilateral promises, but not necessarily from
consensus and agreement.117
The negotiations between parties fall into three categories. First, parties
simply have engaged in preliminary negotiations.118 “Second, the parties
have agreed on all material terms and intend to memorialize this
agreement in a formal document.”119 Third, parties have negotiated and
“agreed on certain terms but left some terms open.”120 In the first category,
the party who did not benefit from the negotiations cannot recover any
damages.121 In the second category, the contract is binding “when the
evidence supports a finding that the parties did not intend the

112. Ben-Shahar, supra note 74, at 1833 n.6 (arguing that promise (which does not require consent)
rather than harm or benefit should be the basis of liability).
113. Id. at 1829.
114. Bellia, Jr., supra note 34, at 1057–58 (describing the problem of “crossing offers” in which
parties may express assent with reference to the anticipated but unknown assent of the other).
115. Ben-Shahar, supra note 74, at 1830–31 (“In contrast to the mutual assent approach, the
no-retraction principle developed here suggests that when two parties attach different, but equally
plausible, meanings to their agreed-upon contractual obligation, the absence of consensus would not
negate any liability. Instead, under the no-retraction principle, each party should have a right to
enforce a contractual obligation according to the meaning intended by the other.” (emphasis
in original)).
116. Id. at 1831.
117. Id. at 1834 (“[I]t is nonetheless the will of a party—a ‘promise’—that ignites liability. The
obligation is voluntary and promise-based, yet decoupled: A contract can be two, potentially different,
bargains, with each party ‘responsible’ for one.” (emphasis omitted)).
118. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120
HARV. L. REV. 661, 664 (2007).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and
Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987).
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formalization of their agreement to be essential.”122 Under the third
category, a prevailing rule is that parties should bargain in good faith over
open terms, or else the refusing party will be responsible for the
reliance expenditure.123
The third category most resembles smart contracts. Smart contracts can
only envision a limited world with a limited set of automated conditions.
Inevitably, all contingencies cannot be determined ex ante. In such digital
environments, however, parties cannot negotiate in good faith for open
terms. This is consistent with the criticism of some law and economics
scholars who stated that good faith negotiations are “deficient,” and the
law should only “protect the promisee’s reliance interest if [t]his promisor
deviated from an agreed investment” without the requirement for good
faith negotiations.124
Although courts have adopted a narrow approach to precontractual
liability,125 this approach can also be helpful in understanding the nature
of smart contracts. As mentioned, smart contracts are similar to a “pail of
water on top of a door” that would inevitably and automatically drop once
the door opens.126 This contract determines the main (automated) quid pro
quo between parties. However, it leaves many contingencies out. What if
the door does not open due to an external event or faulty codes?127 What
if the code does not specify the contingency where multiple recipients
complete the tasks simultaneously? Smart contracts can fit the definition
of a pre-contract because codes have not determined many contingencies
of an agreement. In case of a fall-out, the party who relies on the code
should be awarded the reliance damages (and not expectation interest).128
122. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 118, at 664.
123. Id. at 664–65.
124. Id. at 667.
125. Id. at 672–73. (“In sum, the sample shows that courts consistently have denied recovery for
precontractual reliance unless the parties, by agreeing on something significant, indicated their
intention to be bound.”).
126. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 340.
127. One of the problems with blockchain is 51% attacks. It is a special type of collusion that occurs
in a blockchain network if 51% of the users decide to take certain actions. Frankenfield, supra note 43.
128. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 118, at 704 (“This analysis should help courts for three
significant reasons. First, it shows what must be settled for there to be an actionable preliminary
agreement: the parties must agree on the type of project, such as a shopping center or a financing; on
an imprecise but workable division of authority for investment behavior; and on the rough order in
which their actions are to be taken. These three conditions are each necessary and together sufficient.
Second, the analysis clarifies that a deviation from the agreed investment sequence is a breach. Third,
it recognizes that the law has two related goals: to deter strategic behavior and to encourage
investment. These goals are advanced by awarding the faithful party her verifiable reliance costs if
the other has wrongfully delayed investment. There is no need to protect the promisee’s expectation,
which would be difficult to do in any event for projects that never get past the preliminary stage.”
(footnote omitted)).
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The agreement-to-agree framework can also be helpful. However, as
mentioned, precontractual liability is contested. Moreover, smart
contracts, which currently only contain basic transaction formulas, do not
have many essential elements left open to be determined (e.g. price of a
commodity). Third, the theory of precontractual reliance rests on the idea
of avoiding underinvestment in reliance.129 Whether this reliance
incentive may work in the digital world where computers conduct
transactions is unclear. As such, the agreement-to-agree framework, even
though very helpful, may not capture the entirety of smart contracts.
As explained above, the existing contractual theories of smart contracts
do not capture the nature of smart contracts nor do they fully explain their
enforceability. Part III below argues for the reliance-based theory for
smart contracts as the best theory to protect users.
III. RELIANCE AS THE BASIS FOR SMART CONTRACTS
Automation of contracts requires a new framework for analyzing
contract law. The existing theories, as explained above, do not fully
explain smart contracts. The prevailing bargain theory, which focuses on
assent and mutuality, does not fully capture the intricacies of smart
contracts and does not fully furnish a theory that can protect users. In this
Part, the Article argues for reliance-based theory of smart contracts that
aims to protect users’ reliance. In section A, it provides an overview of
promissory estoppel as the chief theory of reliance in contract law. In
section B, it argues for the reliance-based theory of smart contracts that
protects users’ reliance.
A.

Reliance Theory Best Explains Smart Contracts

Promissory estoppel is the reliance theory of promise enforcement. It
is reflected in section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The
consideration requirement under contract law dictates that only bargainedfor promises form contracts.130 A promise is bargained for “if it is sought
by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee
in exchange for that promise.”131 Promises that are gratuitous and openended are not enforceable.132
129. Craswell, supra note 74, at 490–94; Katz, supra note 74, at 1267–77; Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar,
supra note 74, at 423–29.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
131. Id.
132. Promissory estoppel originally was limited to non-bargain promises in donative settings. See
Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). Later courts expanded its scope to business
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Pursuant to the promissory estoppel doctrine, however, promises that
induce action or forbearance from the promisee can result in liability if,
among others, the promisee reasonably relies on the promise to their
detriment.133 Under promissory estoppel, an equitable remedy, contracts
are binding if “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”134 Promisee’s detrimental reliance renders the promise binding
and enforceable. This doctrine has introduced a reliance-based tort-like
liability into contract law.135
Scholars have debated the scope of promissory estoppel for many
decades.136 Professor Jay Feinman summarized the debate by stressing on
the distinction between enforcement promise or protection reliance as the
two possible bases for promissory estoppel, while arguing for a third
approach based on relational theory of contract law.137 What is clear is
that promissory estoppel of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of
relationships. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); see also Randy E.
Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and
Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 450 (1987).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.”).
134. Id.
135. GILMORE, supra note 73, at 87–91 (arguing that contract and tort were artificially separate and
that contract would ultimately evolve into a reliance-based tort); Randy E. Barnett, The Death of
Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996) (discussing the shift from consent-based to reliance-based
approach in contract law); Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation
of Promissory Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981) (“[T]he principle of section 90 . . . has
become perhaps the most radical and expansive development of this century in the law of promissory
liability.”); Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 949–50 (showing that
section 90 promissory estoppel has been “virtually extinguished” from much of the commercial
contracting). Law and economics scholars have debated whether the reliance-based approach of the
promissory estoppels is consistent from efficiency and economics. See Eric A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003). Some
scholars also rejected the tort-like characterization of promissory estoppel by arguing that promissory
estoppel doctrine is “merely [a] substitute doctrinal method[] for showing the assent required for an
enforceable consensual exchange.” See Kostritsky, supra note 73, at 901–02; see also Juliet P.
Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as
Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2002).
136. See, e.g., Kostritsky, supra note 73, at 964 (arguing that courts should use promissory estoppel
“when persuasive barriers to, or explanations for dispensing with, explicit reciprocal or formalized
contracts exist and a plausible benefit to the promisor can be identified”); Metzger & Phillips, supra
note 73, at 863–64 (arguing that promissory estoppel is a tort-like and independent theory of recovery
that is different from contractual liability); Feinman, supra note 73, at 303–11 (shedding light on the
debate between enforcement of promise or the protection of reliance as the basis for
promissory estoppel).
137. Feinman, supra note 73, at 303–11.
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Contracts made its way for courts to impose liability when the
relationship is not contractual. As Professor Randy Barnett & Professor
Mary Becker stated after analyzing the case law, “courts have . . . used
promissory estoppel as a remedy for promissory or factual
misrepresentation . . . on the basis of conventional tort or (possibly)
contract doctrines.”138 Promissory estoppel protects reliance trust of
promisees even if the bargain is deficient or lacking. This approach fits
our increasingly automated contractual relationship as described below.
B.

Reliance Theory Can Help to Protect Users’ Reliance

As stated above, promissory estoppel furnishes a competing basis for
enforcement of non-bargained-for promises. This Article argues that
smart contracts are enforceable because the offeree has detrimentally
relied on the set of conditions presented.139 There is doubt that conditions
coded as smart contracts constitute a “promise” as discussed in contract
law generally (and promissory estoppel).140 Smart contracts resemble a
“pail of water on top of a door” that would inevitably and automatically
drop once the door opens.141 Smart contracts set in motion unalterable
conditions that can only be completed.142
Despite such skepticism, the framework of promissory estoppel best
fits smart contracting. On the one hand, the promisor should “reasonably
expect”143 that the set of coded conditions are likely to induce actions (and
even forbearance) within the platform. On the other hand, the promisee
detrimentally relies on the codes (conditions) provided to attain the
promised reward or return.
Furthermore, the promissory estoppel approach has several advantages
in framing smart contracts. First, the doctrine does not rely on mutuality
of assent or exchange of promises. In fully-automated contracting with
minimal human agent involvement, this doctrine can best explain the
contractual nature of the transaction. Second, instead of the forwardlooking feature of the bargain theory, it is backward-looking—aiming to
remedy harms caused by reliance or misrepresentation.144 Third, the
138. Barnett & Becker, supra note 132, at 496.
139. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
140. Werbach & Cornell, supra note 18, at 340.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. The first element of promissory estoppel according to section 90 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts is that the promisor “should reasonably expect” that the promise “induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. L.
INST. 1981).
144. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 6, at 802.
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reliance-based approach is the “thinnest form of trust,” where trust is only
limited to the statements of another, in this case codes.145 Fourth, the
reliance by the computer may be considered reasonable since it triggers
the transfer only if it sees a match with another computer.146 Fifth, the
doctrine of promissory estoppel arguably provides limited avenues for
damages.147 The party who relies on the promise can claim reliance losses
(as opposed to often more expansive expectation damages).148 In the
digital world, contractual breaches occur largely due to incomplete or
poor coding, not forward-looking promises that trigger expectations.
Hence, awarding reliance losses—often awarded in tort cases149—can be
a more appropriate remedy.150 Moreover, due to automated and binary
features of smart contracts, partial performances are rare. Equally, smart
contracting
present
few
opportunity
costs
that
justify
expectation damages.151
This view of smart contracts also avoids the problems legal scholars
have faced with the issue of consent and assent in other new forms of
contracting. In the last several years, consent has been the subject of

145. Id. at 801.
146. See, e.g., Craswell, supra note 74, at 491–95 (arguing that the offeree should be reasonable in
its reliance on a promise to avoid inefficient reliance); see also Richard Craswell, Performance,
Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 365–66 (1989) (“The only remedy
capable of optimizing both parties’ incentives (at least, the only remedy identified in the existing
literature) is one that limits the promisee to recovering no more than the value that his expectation
interest would have had if he had chosen the socially optimal level of reliance.” (emphasis omitted)).
147. Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 131, 131–32 (1987).
148. See id. at 132–33.
149. See id. at 155–63. The mismatch between what the code is and what the code ought to be is
most similar to misrepresentation in tort. Courts seem to have used promissory estoppel to afford tort
remedy for misrepresentation. Put differently, courts awarded reliance damages in promissory
estoppel cases, which most closely resemble non-intentional misrepresentation. See id.
150. Moreover, promissory estoppel in this context also does not have the problem of partperformance as in unilateral contracts. Under unilateral contract doctrine, part-performance can lead
to irrevocability of offers. Arguably, the doctrine of part-performance cannot be reconciled with
blockchain technology. For example, in the context of Bitcoin, many computers perform complex
computational mechanisms in order to be the first to solve the problem and receive the reward
(Bitcoin). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (“Where an offer invites
an offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an
option contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a
beginning of it.”); see, e.g., Steiner v. Thexton, 226 P.3d 359 (Cal. 2010) (ruling that in the context
of unilateral contracts when part of the consideration requested is rendered, the offeror is bound to
a contract).
151. Opportunity costs refer to the loss of an opportunity for contracting parties to make alternative
contracts. See Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF.
L. REV. 1432 (1985). Opportunity damages award the non-breaching party the benefit that party
would have enjoyed by signing an alternative contract. Id. Opportunity costs form part of expectation
damages. Id.
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debates in legal scholarship.152 Even though contract law is premised on
the notion of consent, the importance of finding consent is diminishing
due increasingly to cyber contracts and boiler plates. Scholars have
discussed that true consent in this new age is amorphous and can be
obtained by manipulation.153 This approach can be traced in the Uniform
Electronic Transaction Act154 that stipulates that a contract “may be
formed” even if “no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic
agents’ actions.”155
This trend is notable in consumer contracts where the new draft
restatement called for a “grand bargain” in which consent is exchanged
for a more robust unconscionability doctrine.156 Recent behavioral law
scholarship further shows that individuals have a formalistic view of
contracts and often blame themselves for contractual harms even though
they have not properly consented to the contractual terms and
disclosures.157 Studies show that individuals find contracting a matter of
formalizing an agreement rather than an assent.158 The historical data from
the Harvard Case Law Access Project also shows a sharp decline in recent
years on the reference to the notion of consent in case law.159
Against this background enters smart contracts and blockchain
technology. The problem is more acute in blockchain technology where
152. See, e.g., Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE
W. RSRV. L. REV. 57 (2012) (arguing that consent can be obtained through manipulation).
153. See id. at 60 (“To begin with, consent is an amorphous, difficult-to-define concept that is made
increasingly more difficult by the marketplace manipulations of human decision making biases.”).
154. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 14 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 1999).
155. Id.
156. Gregory Klass, Empiricism and Privacy Policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract
Law, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 45, 57 (2019). By restructuring the relationship between consumers and
companies, some argue that smart contracts can offer a solution to “mass-market consumer
contracting” and increase the ability of consumer to negotiate their own contract terms. Joshua
Fairfield, Smart Contract, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE
35, 42–43 (2014).
157. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 1745, 1758 (2014) (“[T]he cognitive psychology literature explain[s] why most people do not
deliberate carefully over the fine print, and the moral psychology literature suggest[s] that most people
view their contractual agreements as serious moral obligations.”).
158. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67
STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1300 (2015) (“The picture that emerges from the studies suggests that intuitions
in this area are actually quite nuanced. Most people have a sense that the law of contracts is one of
formality. On the other hand, their own behavior appears quite sensitive to social and moral
dimensions of promise and disappointment, such that they are reluctant to even revoke an offer, much
less break a deal.”).
159. Historical Trends, HARV. L. SCH.: CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://case.law/trends/
[https://perma.cc/EY5L-S6K2] (To view this data: go to the URL; delete any words in the search bar;
type the word “consent”; and view the chart, which shows the historical use of the word consent in
court cases from 1800 until 2018).

Ghodoosi (Do Not Delete)

78

3/22/2021 11:45 AM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:51

automation, anonymity, and synchronous transactions further isolate the
notion of consent. The legal analysis of smart contracts, therefore, cannot
be based on the notion of consent and mutual assent. As suggested above,
it is the reliance on the technology of blockchain and codes that should
lead the way for the legal analysis of smart contracts. As the recent hacks
of blockchain show, it is the broken codes (or incomplete codes) that will
be at the epicenter of contractual breach.160 The problem of mismatched
codes—between what codes say they would do and what they actually
do—is present in the context of initial coin offerings.161 Some of the
intentional instances of mismatch is fraudulent.162 Most instances,
however, are codes that are insufficient or can be manipulated.163
With the exception of contract-as-reliance, all major contract theories
require mutuality and bargain. The bargain theory requires intention or
mutuality. The reliance theory, which is based on section 90 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts on promissory estoppel, does not
require a full quid-pro-quo bargain.164 It is aimed to protect reasonable
reliance in the absence of a bargained-for exchange.165 Under this
approach, the focus of contract enforceability shifts from manifestation or
assent and consideration to promisee’s reliance and would create a distinct
type of liability.166
In smart contracts, however, the manifestation of human intention
occurs solely at the outset of entering the platform while human
involvement, let alone mutuality of assent, is absent from each
transaction. The socio-economics approach to contracting also requires an
exchange of promises or societal norms. Neither of these elements can be
found in an automated digital world.167 Smart contracts resemble the
160. Reza M. Parizi, Ali Dehghantanha, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo & Amritraj Singh, Empirical
Vulnerability Analysis of Automated Smart Contracts Security Testing on Blockchains, CASCON ’18:
PROC. OF THE 28TH ANN. INT’L CONF. ON COMPUT. SCI. & SOFTWARE ENG’G, Oct. 2018, at 103.
161. Cohney et al., supra note 20, at 598–99 (showing empirically that CO code and ICO
disclosures often do not match).
162. Id. at 595–97.
163. Parizi et al., supra note 160.
164. For the discussion of promissory estoppel, see supra section III.A.
165. Feinman, supra note 73, at 303–11 (shedding light on the debate between enforcement of
promise or the protection of reliance as the basis for promissory estoppel); Farnsworth, supra note
121, at 677; Barnett & Becker, supra note 132, at 445–46; Michael I. Swygert & Donald W. Smucker,
Promissory Estoppel in Florida: Growing Recognition of Promissory Obligation, 16 STETSON L.
REV. 1 (1986); James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 548 (1995).
166. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (“We deem it would be
a mistake to regard an action grounded on promissory estoppel as the equivalent of a breach of
contract action.”).
167. In law and economics, for example, contracts are enforceable since parties are better off ex
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“truly discrete” exchange transaction hypothetical that Professor Macneil
put forward in 1977.168 Such a transaction would be separated from all
present, past, and future relations, and occur between “total strangers,
brought together by chance (not by any common social structure)” while
each party “would have to be completely sure of never again seeing or
having anything else to do with the other.”169
As explained above, therefore, a reliance-based approach can be a
better fit for framing smart contracting. This view is also relevant for
resolution of smart contract disputes. The consent theory leads parties to
decipher and find programmer’s elusive intent. My approach, however, is
to place the emphasis on the collective reliance of all users. As a result,
the best contractual dispute mechanism would be collective wisdom of the
users, as I explain below in Part IV. But first it is important to understand
the foundational problems with smart contracts from a contract law
perspective before understanding the best dispute resolution mechanism.
The following Part addresses two main problems with smart contracts.
IV. TWO PROBLEMS OF SMART CONTRACTS
Despite the name, smart contracts are not smart in every aspect. Some
main issues include the perpetual incompleteness—a problem shared with
the traditional form of contracts—and the lack of entry point for legal
resolution. This Part identifies readily available solutions to enhance
smart contracts, such as finding the collective users’ reliance, creating a
common fund to provide compensation, and adopting a hybrid
contract approach.
A.

Smart Contracts Are Incomplete

Almost all contracts are incomplete.170 Contracts are incomplete at least
for two reasons: parties fail to specify all future contingencies or the

ante as a result of an exchange of promises. ERIC A. POSNER, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 27–28
(2d ed. 2016) (“The conventional, utilitarian or welfarist explanation for why courts should normally
enforce contracts is that if the parties are rational and fully informed, the contract will make both
parties better off (ex ante) without making third parties worse off. . . . [F]or example, a contract in
which Seller sells an apple to Buyer in return for $1. Buyer prefers the apple to $1 and Seller prefers
$1 to the apple; no third party is affected by this transaction.”).
168. Macneil, supra note 76, at 856 (emphasis omitted).
169. Id. This hypothetical cannot always apply to the blockchain technology because in retail,
parties know other parties well. They simply automate the enforcement of their transaction by using
smart contracts.
170. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (explaining that contracts are incomplete
when parties fail to specify parties’ duties or are insensitive in the face of future constituencies).
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contract is “insensitive to relevant future contingencies.”171 Smart
contracts, similar to all other contracts, are destined to be incomplete.172
This was proven in the 2016 hack of a firm that used smart contracts to
create a decentralized organization. The DAO—or decentralized
autonomous organization—was a crowdfunding platform on blockchain
that used Ethereum.173 Using the code of the smart contract for the
platform, the hacker managed to transfer ether cryptocurrency to a “child
DAO” that had a similar structure as the main DAO.174 The term hacking
may not be accurate; the hacker in fact applied the terms of the smart
contract in a way that allowed the hacker to transfer funds elsewhere.175
The hacker later wrote a letter arguing that the transfer of funds was legal
since smart contracts are their own arbiters and no outside authority can
change the rules of the transactions.176 The attacker may have been right.
Smart contracts are supposed to be immutable and account for all
contingencies. In the same vein, some have argued that smart contracts
are new forms of self-help “because no recourse to a court is needed for
the machine to execute the agreement.”177 Following the attack, several
users suggested splitting the DAO but could not get the votes. It was the
attacker who appeared to voluntarily stop after hearing of the
split proposal.178
The incompleteness in smart contracts, however, can be different.

171. Id. at 92 n.29 (“There are two distinct ways for a contract to be incomplete. First, a contract
may fail to specify the parties’ duties for specific future contingencies. For example, a contract for
the construction of a third floor to a house may not state the parties’ respective rights and
responsibilities should the entire house burn down before construction is started. Since construction
of a third floor is impossible (without the lower two floors), the contract does not cover the
contingency of the house burning down. The second form of contractual incompleteness is more
subtle. A contract may also be incomplete in that it is insensitive to relevant future
contingencies. . . . For example, consider a contract that simply obligates one party to construct a
garage adjacent to a house. On the face this contract imposes a duty to build a garage whether or not
the adjacent house burns down before construction of the garage is complete. The contract is
incomplete in this second sense, however, because the duty to build a garage is not sufficiently
dependent on future contingencies. If the adjacent house burns down, the parties probably would want
to adjust the terms of contract. Such contracts we call insufficiently state-contingent.”).
172. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 3 (arguing that smart contracts do not eliminate ambiguity).
173. See generally Nathan Reiff, Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO), INVESTOPEDIA
(June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/what-dao/ [https://perma.cc/W2KJ-Y8XH].
174. Siegel, supra note 68.
175. Raskin, supra note 18, at 336–37. The DAO terms and conditions stated that DAO’s code
superseded all explanations, guarantees, and statements. Therefore, the DAO code was controlling
(code is the entire contract). However, despite this explicit language, the code cannot be the entire
contract in the DAO and possibly all smart contracts. Kolber, supra note 20, at 217–24.
176. Siegel, supra note 68.
177. Raskin, supra note 18, at 333.
178. Siegel, supra note 68.
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Generally, there are three layers of contractual agreements in a transaction
involving smart contracts. One is the code of the smart contract (if/then).
The second is the code of the platform which determines the validation
mechanism. The last layer concerns the terms and conditions that users
subscribe to prior to using the platform. Scholars have shown that
inconsistency often exists between these three layers.179 Moreover, the
syntax used in coding (e.g., if/then) could be subject to controversy and
“requires something outside the program itself” for it to have meaning.180
The incompleteness of smart contracts therefore largely arises out of
broken codes and inconsistency of the aforementioned three layers.
A recent case from the Singapore International Commercial Court,
decided based on common law, further illuminates this issue.181 In this
case, the defendant installed a software to ensure cryptocurrency trades
occur at their market price.182 Due to an oversight in coding, however,
seven trades of cryptocurrency occurred at 250 times the market exchange
rate.183 The defendant, upon discovery of this issue, reversed the seven
trades.184 The plaintiff who benefited from this software glitch sued for
breach of contract.185 The terms and conditions of the software states that
“once an order is filled” the transfer is “irreversible.”186
The court continued by stating that the intent of “the operator or
controller of the machine” should be considered.187 In other words, “the
mind of the programmer” at the time of drafting the code is most relevant
in cases of software glitches.188 As a result, the court decided that the
trades should not have been reversed and the reversal goes against the
intent of the coder.189 This case is not directly about smart contracts but it
179. See Cohney et al., supra note 20 (showing empirically that CO code and ICO disclosures often
do not match); Kolber, supra note 20, at 220. To further explain, one can analogize it with apps in
smart phones. One layer is computer codes underlying the app. Another layer refers to the codes of
the platform on which the app runs (e.g., Android). Another layer that can govern parties’ relationship
is the terms & conditions users agree to prior to using the app.
180. Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 11. The author further argues that “no computer program can
determine its own semantics.” Id.
181. Anisha Franklin & Kimarie Cheang, How Are Contract and Trust Law Principles Applied in
Cryptocurrency Disputes?, HFW LITIG. BRIEFING (Holman Fenwick Willan LLP, London, U.K.),
July 2019, http://www.hfw.com/How-are-contract-and-trust-law-principles-applied-incryptocurrency-disputes-July-19 [https://perma.cc/SSV3-VGNC].
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (emphasis omitted).
187. Id. (emphasis omitted).
188. Id. (emphasis omitted).
189. Id.
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shows how the court had to navigate between the terms of the software
and its underlying code to determine an incompleteness in the agreement.
Another interesting aspect of the case lies in the argument put forward by
the defendant. The defendant argued for unilateral mistake.190 The mistake
was the software glitch which the plaintiff was aware of and benefitted
from.191 The court, however, stated that at the time of the contract
(transfer) there was no “human involvement” and consequently the
doctrine of unliteral mistake did not apply here.192
B.

Smart Contracts Do Not Allow Entry Points

Smart contracts are incomplete because the underlying codes do not
account for all errors. They are also ambiguous because the platform
codes are subject to change and modification. The problem, however, is
that smart contracts do not allow for any intervention to remedy the
incompleteness or breach.193 In traditional contracting, parties can renegotiate the terms of the agreement or a third party (e.g., a judge)
determines the points of contention upon disagreement or change of
circumstances. In smart contracting, there is no entry point for legal
intervention because: (1) parties are anonymous, (2) codes forming smart
contracts are immutable, and (3) no one can issue a “fiat” to change the
code and the underlying platform.194
How can automated codes which no one controls undergo change or
revision? Imagine A sets up a smart contract whereby B gets paid $1 if it
rains on Thursday or else A will get paid $1. This process is automated
with no human involvement. Now imagine that it hails on Thursday. Who
is supposed to receive the $1?195 On a blockchain, the next block is added
by the consensus mechanism. If consensus is reached that hail is similar
to rain, B will receive $1. If not, A will receive $1. If there is disagreement,
there is a possibility of split. No one can regulate this issue ex post if the
code is not sufficient. This shows that blockchain technology does not
allow for legal entry points.196
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Rodrigues, supra note 19, at 714–27.
194. Anna Gelpern, Abandoned at the Nexus of Contracts, CORP. L. JOTWELL (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://corp.jotwell.com/abandoned-at-the-nexus-of-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/B4R3-CYJB]
(reviewing Rodrigues, supra note 19).
195. This is not just a hypothetical. MetLife insurance developed a smart contract whereby as soon
as a patient uploads a positive diabetes test result, an insurance payment is made into the patient’s
account. See Castillo, supra note 38.
196. Rodrigues, supra note 19, at 714–27.
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The solutions to this problem are not clear yet. One possible solution is
to create a pool of funds by users. Under this proposal, each user gives
some tokens (e.g., cryptocurrency) to a pool of funds in each of the
transactions. The fund can then be used to compensate any contractual
damages. For example, in the DAO attack, the fund could be used to
compensate those who lost cryptocurrency as a result of the attack. The
users can decide on a solution and transfer the necessary amount from the
fund to those users who have been affected by the breach.
Another solution lies in hybrid contracts. Businesses increasingly
intend to use blockchain technology.197 They primarily use “hybrid
contracts,” which are smart contracts that use off-blockchain information
and include it in the chain of blocks.198 Take Walmart for example. In
response to an E. coli infection linked to romaine lettuce, Walmart
launched a pilot blockchain platform to record the supply chain of
lettuce.199 The information that is recorded on blockchain comes from
farmers, warehouse keepers, truck drivers, and others. The hybrid
architecture combines both on- and off-blockchain components, similar to
the Walmart example. Therefore, “[s]ome of the clauses [of the contracts]
are monitored/enforced off-blockchain, whereas others are enforced onblockchain.”200 In short, hybrid blockchain and contracts allow for
external information (external to the chains in the block) to be fed into
the blockchain.
Businesses do not simply let go of their control of the contracts. After
all, contracts and their residual rights create governance.201 Under hybrid
contracts, parties automate their obligations in whole or in part against a
backdrop of a traditional contract. In these circumstances, parties may
stipulate that the code embedded in smart contracts is part of their
agreement.202 Under this approach, smart contracts form part of the
197. Castillo, supra note 38, at 4.
198. Carlos Molina-Jimenez, Ioannis Sfyrakis, Ellis Solaiman, Irene Ng, Meng Weng Wong,
Alexis Chun & Jon Crowcroft, Implementation of Smart Contracts Using Hybrid Architectures with
On- and Off-Blockchain Components, IEEE ’18: 8TH INT’L SYMP. ON CLOUD & SERV. COMPUTING,
Nov. 2018, at 1, 3–8. New efforts are underway to improve the hybrid transactions involving onblockchain and off-blockchain technology. See id.
199. See Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks Its
Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/walmartblockchain-lettuce.html [https://perma.cc/LZW7-46CB].
200. Ellis Solaiman, Todd Wike & Ioannis Sfyrakis, Implementation and Evaluation of Smart
Contracts Using a Hybrid On‐ and Off‐Blockchain Architecture, 33 CONCURRENCY &
COMPUTATION: PRAC. & EXPERIENCE (SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER) e5811, e5813 (2020).
201. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 1731 (2017).
202. FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 80 (“[P]arties can draft master agreements written in
traditional legal prose and can include provisions stipulating that the parties agree that smart contract
code qualifies as valid writing.”).
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agreement between parties. In the case of a disagreement concerning the
smart contract, the traditional contract may prevail.203 This is because the
traditional contract seems to be closer to the parties’ intent. Ricardian
contract is a type of hybrid contract by which a parent document
determines parties’ obligations before its performance through codes
(smart contracts).204 In other words, a Ricardian contract is a traditional
contract whereby parties agree to automate some of its provisions through
smart contracts and blockchain technology.
Hybrid contracts are another way of combatting the problem of entry
points. Parties can always bring their disputes pursuant to the traditional
contract portion of their agreement. However, the hybrid structure still
relies on off-blockchain legal recourses to make smart contracts function.
This limits smart contracts and makes the adjudicative process reliant on
traditional contractual methods. For this reason, there is a need for an
effective and truly decentralized dispute resolution. Part IV analyzes the
current ongoing yet inchoate efforts for decentralized dispute resolution
and offers a new way of doing so.
V.

TOWARDS TRULY DECENTRALIZED USER-BASED
DISPUTE RESOLUTION

New efforts are underway to create a built-in dispute resolution
mechanism in smart contracts. Dispute resolution clauses are already
common in traditional contracting. The majority of consumer and
employment contracts include a dispute resolution clause stipulating that
an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators decides the dispute between
parties.205 Similar to contracts, adjudication or dispute resolution also
leads to solidarity as it brings “disputants into reciprocal recognition and
into the shared perspective.”206 Such dispute resolution mechanisms,
203. Existing laws seem to be silent on this point. For example, Uniform Electronic Transaction
Act provides that automated transactions are binding (§ 14) and render all electronic records
admissible in trial (§ 13). UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE L. 1999). However, it does not directly address the issue of hybrid contracts where contracts
are in part automated and in part non-electronic as described above.
204. Ian Grigg, The Ricardian Contract, IEEE: PROC. OF THE FIRST INT’L WORKSHOP ON ELEC.
CONTRACTING, 2004, at 25.
205. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitration-access-tothe-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/ [https://perma.cc/2YUEZGE9].
206. Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and
Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431, 469 (2010). In Markovits’s view, adjudication and contract both
result in solidarity with differences in “paths to recognition” between subjects:
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which are built into the contract algorithm ex ante, aim to handle more
complex disputes via a distributed system.207
Blockchain technology is benefitting from this common practice. There
are several startups that specialize in blockchain dispute resolution, and
each has its own unique solution to this problem. For example,
OpenBazaar uses the multisig feature208 of Bitcoin and therefore requires
at least three signatures (buyer, seller, and a moderator) for completion of
each transaction.209 Mattereum tries to connect real property rights to
smart contracts to create legally enforceable contracts.210 In doing so,
Mattereum promises dispute resolution that is effective.211 Kleros operates
on a decentralized network that randomly assigns disputes to a group of
self-selected jurors.212 Aragon selects several anonymous arbitrators from
its pool to determine the outcome of a dispute.213 Sagewise devised an
Adjudicative solidarity employs an intensive, transformative process in order to draw disputants
into reciprocal recognition and into the shared perspective that such recognition establishes, even
when the disputants do not intend to engage one another in this way, and indeed to induce them
to recognize each other against their initial intentions. Contractual solidarity, by contrast, must
itself be directly intended by those who participate in the contract, even if they are motivated not
by solidarity but rather by self-interest.
Id.
207. See Federico Ast & Clément Lesaege, Kleros, A Decentralized Court System for the Internet
(Abridged), MEDIUM (Sept. 18, 2017), https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-a-decentralized-courtsystem-for-the-internet-abridged-1e415c04604a [https://perma.cc/8SWR-557V].
208. Multisig (multisignature) refers to requiring multiple keys to authorize a Bitcoin transaction.
See What Is a Multisig Wallet?, BINANCE ACAD. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://academy.binance.com/en/
articles/what-is-a-multisig-wallet [https://perma.cc/SE46-ETUE].
209. How Moderators and Dispute Resolution Work in OpenBazaar, OPENBAZAAR (Feb. 23,
2016), https://openbazaar.org/blog/how-moderators-and-dispute-resolution-work-in-openbazaar/
[https://perma.cc/E6CY-SSV3] (“Instead of just having one person control the bitcoins in a certain
account (called addresses), you can have multiple people control the same bitcoins. However, they
can only send those coins to another address if a certain number of people controlling the bitcoins
agree. For example, you can have a 2-of-2 multisig address. This means that there are two people who
control the address, and both of them must agree to a transaction before the bitcoins can be sent
anywhere else. A 2-of-3 address means three people control the address, and two of them must agree
before the funds can be spent. OpenBazaar uses 2-of-3 multisig addresses for transactions. When a
buyer wants to purchase a listing, instead of sending the funds directly to the seller, he will send the
funds to the multisig account. The three people who control this account are the buyer, the seller, and
a trusted third party selected beforehand. We call these trusted third parties ‘moderators.’”).
210. See For Truth in Trade, MATTEREUM, https://mattereum.com [https://perma.cc/3YMWXJYA]; see also Darcy W. E. Allen, Aaron M. Lane & Marta Poblet, The Governance of Blockchain
Dispute Resolution, 25 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 85–90 (2019); Vinay Gupta, The First Mattereum
Briefing, MEDIUM (Dec. 15, 2017), https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity/the-firstmattereum-briefing-11a67c75d840 [https://perma.cc/D22U-4NT3].
211. Id.
212. See About Kleros, KLEROS, https://kleros.io/about [https://perma.cc/2FBJ-GEKE]; Allen et
al., supra note 210, at 91.
213. Tatu Kärki, Aragon Network Jurisdiction Part 1: Decentralized Court, ARAGON (July 18,
2017), https://aragon.org/blog/aragon-network-jurisdiction-part-1-decentralized-court-c8ab2a
675e82 [https://perma.cc/ZL6X-H59K].
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embedded layer into smart contracts, which enables a toolkit to resolve
coding errors and security vulnerabilities along with features to amend
contracts or resolve disputes.214 An academic article also suggests creating
an “open-source platform ecosystem” for smart contract dispute
resolution
that
preserves
its
anonymity
and
calls
it
“distributed jurisdiction.”215
The blockchain technology is nascent and so is dispute resolution
premised on this technology. It is also evolving rapidly. Such nascent
systems largely rely on a so-called “proof-of-stake model,” in which a
select stakeholder resolves the disputes.216 After a dispute arises, a few
users are selected to serve as jurors to decide the dispute. If such a
mechanism is built into contracts, it is possible that more complex
contracts that require judgment can be “smart.” For example, a smart
contract code can state that if it rains on Sunday, $1 will be transferred
from party A to B. If, however, it hails on Sunday, the question arises
whether such transfer should be made. This incompleteness in the contract
requires judgment and decision-making. The built-in dispute resolution
mechanism enables judgments to be made in such events that are
unaccounted for in the code. Unlike traditional dispute resolution
mechanisms, the new efforts involve other users within the platform to
exercise their judgments, not third parties outside of the platform. Due to
the importance of judgment and decision-making, the future of smart
contracts, arguably, depends on an effective blockchain-based
dispute resolution.217
Based on the existing technology, this Article argues that blockchainbased dispute resolution can offer three important features capable of
214. See Jonathan Shieber, Sagewise Pitches a Service to Verify Claims and Arbitrate Disputes
over
Blockchain
Transactions,
TECHCRUNCH
(Aug.
3,
2018,
12:51
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/03/sagewise-pitches-a-service-to-verify-claims-and-arbitratedisputes-over-blockchain-transactions/ [https://perma.cc/LP4N-6FKG]; see also Allen et al., supra
note 210, at 85.
215. Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, 73 BUS. LAW. 109,
148 (2018). According to this piece, several limitations exist in the current dispute resolution efforts.
First, the existing solutions do not assure “full anonymity.” Id. Second, random selection of arbitrators
would fail since users would like to appoint the arbitrators with the “highest possible expertise.” Id.
Third, the democratic selection of arbitrators along with a lack of subject-matter expertise would
result in users’ lack of confidence. Id. Fourth, the current solutions do not necessarily allow for use
of attorneys. Id. Fifth, the current solutions do not always allow users to use a different dispute
resolution mechanism. Id.
216. See infra section IV.A.
217. The future effectiveness of the blockchain is also dependent on the reliability of Oracle-type
blockchain platform for uncontroversial cases. See Benjamin Pirus, Oracle Blockchain Platform
Helps Big Businesses Incorporate Blockchain, FORBES (July 22, 2019, 1:05 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminpirus/2019/07/22/oracle-blockchain-platform-helps-bigbusinesses-incorporate-blockchain/#2c7a9d55797b [https://perma.cc/5ATS-GTKM].
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transforming contractual disputes, distinct from traditional dispute
resolution: (1) a mechanism for consensus that may be based on a larger
pool of arbitrators (or jurors), (2) dispute resolution that can be distributed
and functions on a random basis (avoiding the repeat problems), and
(3) enforcement that is independent from judicial systems. The inclusion
of a dispute resolution mechanism can change the smart contract scene
through the interjection of human interaction at the tail end of the process
(i.e., resolution of the dispute). Moreover, this Article argues that instead
of a handful of users that are selected to resolve disputes, blockchain
technology has the ability to access a large pool of users who can be
selected randomly to resolve disputes. In sum, the dispute resolution
mechanism brings back the human connection ex post and helps with
existing problems such as mandatory arbitration or repeat players through
enabling a large anonymous group of users randomly selected to
resolve controversies.
A.

Dispute Resolution Should Be Truly Decentralized

Traditional dispute resolution often does not involve consensus.
Typically, parties appoint an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators (often
three) to resolve their disputes outside of the judicial system.218 One of the
main breakthroughs of blockchain technology, however, pertains to its
consensus mechanism as explained above. Several consensus
mechanisms exist in blockchain technology. Two of the most widely used
are proof-of-work and proof-of-stake. Under the proof-of-work consensus
mechanism, every node in the network can validate transactions. Nodes
often compete to verify the transactions to receive a reward. This is the
consensus mechanism for Bitcoin.219 The other most common consensus
mechanism is proof-of-stake, in which the system chooses a node based
on the tokens held by the node (its stake). For example, if a node holds
ten tokens and the other node 100, the latter is more likely to be chosen to
validate the next transaction and hence add the next block.220
The consensus mechanisms of the blockchain technology may vary.221
218. What We Do, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://adr.org/Arbitration [https://perma.cc/2MYV-K4XN].
219. MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 44, at 7–8; see also Andrew Tar, Proof-of-Work, Explained,
COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 17, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/explained/proof-of-work-explained
[https://perma.cc/CE8Y-ZFSW].
220. See MCQUINN & CASTRO, supra note 44, at 7–8; Ameer Rosic, Proof of Work vs Proof of
Stake: Basic Mining Guide, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/proof-of-work-vs-proofof-stake/ [https://perma.cc/U7XV-4PH3].
221. For a more nuanced analysis of the different consensus mechanisms, see ARATI BALIGA,
PERSISTENT, UNDERSTANDING BLOCKCHAIN CONSENSUS MODELS (2017),
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The relevant point here is that the blockchain technology enables a
structure in which different nodes engage in the validation process. In
other words, the network allows for more nodes to participate in the
decision-making process. Underlying the idea to build a dispute resolution
on blockchain is its capacity to reach a wider network of individuals. This
capacity is essential for the consensus mechanisms described above as
various nodes must participate in the network for the validation process.
The current efforts related to blockchain-based dispute resolution focus
again on expertise (and a proof-of-stake model) whereby the system
selects a handful of individuals for dispute resolution.222
Regardless of current efforts, blockchain has the capability of
transforming the dispute resolution mechanism. For example, in the
blockchain technology, any node can be an arbitrator of a dispute.
Decisions can also be made through voting.223 Imagine a dispute between
a buyer and a seller in which each side proposes its own narrative. Each
participant in the network can review the dispute and vote for either the
buyer or the seller. The users are incentivized to conduct such review
because either they would receive a token (e.g., cryptocurrency) or
because they are stakeholders of the platform. This development alone,
which is technologically feasible with blockchain,224 can transform
dispute resolution (and law generally) if it receives wide acceptance. This
trend can also go against the tendency towards centralization in the
judiciary which has happened in the United States and elsewhere.225
B.

Network-Based Dispute Resolution Can Solve Some Arbitration
Problems for Small Claims

The distributed and decentralized feature of the blockchain technology
can help combat one of the principal problems of the current dispute
resolution mechanism. Arbitration—as the leading method for dispute
resolution—is believed to be elitist and involves only a handful of

https://www.persistent.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/WP-Understanding-BlockchainConsensus-Models.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHU4-JGLJ].
222. See KLEROS, supra note 212; see also Allen et al., supra note 210, at 86.
223. A Startup has already put forward a system which is based on this model. Under the JUR
model, any user can stake their token to verify the raised dispute and cast a vote. See Blockchain
Technology Is Now Entering the Dispute Resolution Arena, NASDAQ (Aug. 7, 2018, 11:37 AM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/blockchain-technology-is-now-entering-the-dispute-resolutionarena-cm1003487 [https://perma.cc/4FQA-4BGE].
224. See id.
225. See, e.g., MICHAEL DICHIO, THE US SUPREME COURT AND THE CENTRALIZATION OF
FEDERAL AUTHORITY 6 (2018) (“The judiciary’s tendency to centralize federal authority over time
represents a crucial dimension in the construction of political authority.”).
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individuals over a wide range of cases.226 For example, in international
arbitration, recent data suggests that only a handful of individuals in the
network of professionals decide the majority of the disputes.227
The problems of repeat appointments and the repeat player effect
commonly occur in arbitration. Under the current system (both in
domestic and international arbitration), a small group of individuals are
often selected to adjudicate disputes.228 In the same vein, studies show that
those who utilize arbitration often (repeat players) have a significant
advantage over others.229 Proponents of the system often claim that this
phenomena is due to the need for expertise.230 This is not necessarily
supported by existing data, which to the contrary shows that participants
do not list expertise as their main reason to use arbitration and complain
about the repeat players problem.231 The problem may be structural.
Individuals often are channeled by their counsels and the arbitral
institutions to appoint the same arbitrators. Moreover, the repeat players
have a significant advantage due to their information and influence on the
selection of arbitrators among others.232
The promise of blockchain-based dispute resolution rests on the notion
that it is distributed, randomized, and anonymized. The distributed feature
guarantees more participants in the decision-making process while
randomization prevents concentration of decision-making in select nodes.
This does not negate the possibility that over time users will “inevitably

226. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005); Anthea
Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM.
J. INT’L L. 45 (2013); David Hacking, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility: A Response: What Happens if the
Icelandic Arbitrator Falls Through the Ice?, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 73, 74–75 (1998); Diane A. Desierto,
Rawlsian Fairness and International Arbitration, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 939 (2015).
227. In investment arbitration one study reveals that the top twenty-five arbitrators, which only
account for 4% of all arbitrators, are appointed in over a third of all arbitration cases. Malcolm
Langford, Daniel Behn & Runar Hilleren Lie, The Revolving Door in International Investment
Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ECON. L. 301, 310 (2017).
228. Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite
Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 68–78 (2010).
229. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
230. See, e.g., Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 13, 19 (1997) (“Given the
high stakes and great sensitives frequently involved in arbitration, there seems to be a good case for
supporting the emergence and recognition of an elite corps of international arbitrators.”).
231. WHITE & CASE, 2018 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2019), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/
download/publications/qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L3DNAK5].
232. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011).
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demand the highest possible expertise of their judges and arbitrators.” 233
Network-based dispute resolution simply promises that a wider network
of individuals be available to disputants. Anonymization can also improve
any biases that exist in current dispute resolution mechanisms.
A simple graph can demonstrate the difference between the judiciary,
extrajudicial dispute resolution mechanism, and a possible blockchainbased dispute resolution. The centralized network best resembles the
judiciary system while the decentralized network shows the existing
dispute resolution system, in which some nodes attract most of the
connections. The third graph shows the possibility of a blockchain-based
dispute resolution in which everyone could have easy and equal access to
all the nodes. As explained above, this system can mitigate the problem
of repeat appointments and repeat players.
Figure 1:
Three Types of Network Connectivity

C.

Smart Dispute Resolution Awards Are Enforceable

Blockchain-based dispute resolution may also obviate the need for
judicial enforcement. For the dispute resolution to be effective, smart
contracts should be designed to allow for direct enforcement mechanisms.
For this reason, some existing startups have come up with solutions such

233. Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 215, at 161.
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as freezing the smart contract,234 live contract,235 or Ricardian contracts.236
Although these efforts are still developing, they demonstrate a trend
where contracts would include a built-in enforcement mechanism. The
inclusion of an ex ante built-in enforcement mechanism shows another
possible major breakthrough of the blockchain technology in
dispute resolution.
One of the breakthroughs in globalization was the wide ratification of
the New York Convention where 159 countries accepted to recognize and
enforce international arbitral awards issued elsewhere.237 The New York
Convention allowed for limited reviewability by national courts prior to
their recognition and enforcement of awards.238 Blockchain technology,
on the other hand, is promising a self-enforcement mechanism which is
built into smart contracts.
This self-help feature of smart contracts239 can have unprecedented
challenges. One of the main developments could be the elimination of the
reviewability function of national courts for dispute resolutions outside of
the judiciary. This development has already begun where courts rarely
review arbitral awards.240 Courts can limit dispute resolution outside of
234. See, e.g., Sagewise, Leading Smart Contract Dispute Resolution Company, Raises $1.25
Million Seed Funding, Led by Wavemaker Genesis, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 7, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180807005319/en/Sagewise-Leading-Smart-ContractDispute-Resolution-Company [https://perma.cc/2WM2-UBZB] (“The company’s SDK provides the
tools and infrastructure needed for the effective handling of disputes at any stage in the development
and execution of smart contracts, freezing contracts in place while they are being resolved.”).
235. The LTO platform creates an ad hoc private blockchain for each Live Contract. Such a
blockchain is not intended as an immutable ledger but ensures all parties have an up-to-date
countersigned history of events and shared states. . . . Live Contracts do not directly hold value
but describe how two or more parties should interact. The intent is much closer to that of a
traditional (paper) contract.
LTO NETWORK, BLOCKCHAIN FOR DECENTRALIZED WORKFLOWS 3, https://lto.network/documents
/LTO%20Network%20-%20Technical%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9VT-U724].
236. See MATTEREUM, supra note 210; see also Allen et al., supra note 210, at 85; Gupta, supra
note 210.
237. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; Status: Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) (the “New York Convention”), UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2
[https://perma.cc/9HNL-HW3P].
238. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 237,
at art. V.
239. Raskin, supra note 18, at 333.
240. See generally FARSHAD GHODOOSI, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE PUBLIC
POLICY EXCEPTION (2018) (showing the impact of the notion of transnational public policy on
enforceability of arbitral award); Farshad Ghodoosi, Fall of Last Safeguard in Global
Dejudicialization: Protecting Public Interest in Business Disputes, 98 OR. L. REV. 99 (2020)
(showing with empirical data the decreasing importance of public policy review in the context of
international commercial arbitration).
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the judiciary. With blockchain technology, it is much harder for the
judiciary to know of the existence of disputes since even enforcement of
awards do not need judicial help.
CONCLUSION
Contracts are increasingly becoming digitized. In parallel, businesses
are rapidly adopting digital contracts. Such digital (smart) contracts
operate as self-executing, self-enforcing, automated contracts in which
parties involved are often anonymous. This trend is a departure from the
traditional notion of contracts, whereby consent and forward-looking
promises play a pivotal role in ex ante formation and ex post enforcement
of contracts.
The legal nature of smart contracts remains shrouded in ambiguity. For
example, terms and conditions of the platform, the underlying platform
codes, and smart contract codes may be conflicting when it comes to
parties’ obligations and the binding nature of smart contracts.241
Moreover, the possibility of hacks or code failures always exist.242 Given
the new developments, this Article suggests that smart contracts should
be analyzed through the lens of reliance-based contracting (similar to
promissory estoppel or tort-based misrepresentation). Moreover, the
reliance-based approach solves some of the problems posed by the
consent-based approach in digital contracting. Further, this Article
analyzes the new efforts aimed at the resolution of disputes on the
blockchain platform. It identifies key features of blockchain-based dispute
resolution that have the capability of modifying contractual disputes and
the very act of contracting. The Article argues that blockchain-based
dispute resolution results in seismic changes such as decentralized
decision-making, network-based dispute resolution, and extrajudicial
enforcement of decisions. More importantly, human connection and
recognition can only be found in the dispute phase of contracting. This
marks a shift from traditional contractual solidarity to digital solidarity.243

241. Kolber, supra note 20, at 217–26.
242. See id. at 203–04.
243. Markovits, supra note 206, at 469.

